Sri Lanka Police: Headless At A Critical Moment-by Merril Gunaratne
Source:Thuppahis
Merril Gunaratne, in morningLK, 11 August 2024, where the headline reads “The Police: A ‘headless’ body for the election”
Any organisation, be it professional, social, or sports, has to be led. The leader steers the organisation on a charted path to achieve its goals and aspirations. He [or SHE] has a paramount role to guide humans within the organisation towards identified goals and targets. The leader steers it with a mix of inspiration, discipline, delegation of authority, supervision, and monitoring. In an ideal sense, leadership has much to do with its successes or failures. It is a sine qua non or an integral element for any organisation to prosper.
Challenges to the Police in the times of a crucial Presidential Election are manifold. In normal or ordinary times alone, those in power structures interfere with the Police. This odious feature, starting with the advent of the United National Party (UNP) to power in 1977, gathered momentum over the course of time.
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Such intrusions were rendered more possible by compliant Police heads. I would consider us as being 60-70% responsible and politicians 30-40% responsible for interference. The blame for interference should mostly be levelled at the Police for its failure to stand up and express its views. Some in top positions have conveniently accused politicians of interference. This is an evasive tactic to cover up failures or abdication of responsibility.
Acquiescence and accommodation fall into the realm of abetment to violate laws, rules, and conventions. Ideally the Inspector General of Police (IGP), if he is strong and convincing enough to express professional views, could keep many interferences at bay. But the Police saga is sadly replete with submission by some IGPs to political dictates.
Beginning in 1977, this syndrome has accentuated with time, with Cyril Herath being the only IGP who was an exception. He remains a beacon amid a dark cloud. Some of his successors from the late 1980s onwards allowed things to proceed from bad to worse.
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This is the backdrop in which the Police is now poised to perform at the forthcoming election.
As indicated in the foregoing paragraphs, some IGPs had failed over time to assert themselves and exercise authority in the course of normal Police work, becoming pliant prey to politics. We now have the case of Deshabandu Tennakoon, an IGP who has been reduced to a nonentity, at least for some time, by the Supreme Court. The public perceive him to be partisan. His has been a self-inflicted wound.
My colleague in the Police, H.M.G.B. Kotakadeniya, recently told the media aptly that Tennakoon had become a prey to politics. He has been just another one of those IGPs who had failed to resist encroachment. It may not, however, be fair to blame him alone. The roots of the malaise certainly lie in the past, beginning in the late 1980s.
The reality
In principle and theory, leadership is an integral element in the efficacy of an organisation. However, given the sad saga of some compliant Police heads over time, how would an IGP considered a favourite of power structures perform at an election?
More precisely, if Tennakoon was in the IGP seat on the fringe of such a crucial election, would he have asserted authority to insist that the Police discharge its exertions impartially and equitably? In my view, going by his reputation, it is difficult to think that he could have withstood unusual pressures, which invariably arise at an election.
Therefore, although in principle an IGP is expected to set the pace and steer a large organisation to act without fear or favour, leadership under a pliant IGP at the time of an election could vitiate and mar the highest standards expected of the Police.
In the current context where each territorial Deputy Inspector General (DIG) would have to face challenges in an environment sans directions from an IGP or acting IGP, territorial DIGs who are in the field may differ in responding to unreasonable political dictates. Some may be less pliant than others.
Such inconsistency and lack of uniformity may be more conducive towards performance by the Police than if an IGP with a proclivity to grant favours and permit dubious practices exerted centralised control over all territorial DIGs. We may then see a uniformity in abuse.
To be precise, a lack of uniformity and consistency may therefore be more advantageous to the discharge of Police functions than if all DIGs had to obey the dictates of such an IGP. The scope for abuse may be greater with centralised control should the reins of the highest seat be in the hands of an officer who is vulnerable to encroachment.
I read in Sunday papers of 4 August that the Secretary to the Ministry of Public Security had been empowered to perform the functions of the IGP at the forthcoming election. It is doubtful if he can stamp his authority over the Police, for he simply does not have the ‘feel’ of Police work. He will at best be a poor option.
The Police will thus remain a headless body. Ironically, it may be a climate more conducive for less worse standards, with territorial DIGs working according to different standards at the election.
In this article, I have stated with conviction that beginning in the late 1980s, some IGPs have succumbed increasingly to politics. I am reminded of whatthe German Minister of Defence General Kurt von Schleicher said to the media in the late 1920s.
Schleicher, a kingmaker at the time, had told the media about his choice of Franz von Papen to succeed Heinrich Brüning as Chancellor. He had said: “I don’t need a head, I need a hat.” What he meant was that Papen would be a figurehead whom he could manipulate.
This aphorism may fit a few IGPs who have been willing tools of power structures. They have been more ‘hats’ than ‘heads’.
Role of DIG – Elections
It would be appropriate to examine the role of the DIG – Elections. The DIG – Elections has two roles to perform.
First, he has to lay the groundwork or plan for an election. This task would embody educating field officers on election laws, and identifying and allocating personnel and logistical support for the Police to discharge responsibilities connected with the election. This is the preparatory stage.
The more crucial role is the process of monitoring violations of election laws and exhorting field Police officers to act correctly. He must provide strength and security for the Police to resist encroachment. This important second role can be identified as the ‘enforcement’ stage.
For this crucial role, the designated DIG – Elections has to be senior to all territorial DIGs in the field, for his instructions and orders have to be obeyed by territorial DIGs. The writ of the DIG – Elections should clearly prevail over DIGs in the field.
Some IGPs have deviated from this procedure. They chose to appoint junior favourites as DIG – Elections. This has been a controversial step. A lowly-placed DIG, I.T. Canagaratnam, was DIG – Elections when Ernest Perera and Frank de Silva served as IGP.
In my time, Senior DIG R. Sunderalingam and Senior DIG Leo Perera discharged the role of DIG – Elections with finesse, for they were senior enough to dictate orders to all territorial DIGs. Incidentally, Perera was denied an extension of service for having discharged his role equitably, with IGP Perera doing nothing to protect him.
Deviations from appointing the most senior DIG as DIG – Elections may not be conducive for the Police to discharge its responsibilities efficiently and equitably at elections.
The writer is a retired Senior Deputy Inspector General of Police….
The views and opinions expressed in this column are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of this publication…. viz morning.lk
